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ABSTRACT: Enkratic reasoning – reasoning from believing that you ought to do something to 
an intention to do that thing – seems good. But there is a puzzle about how it could be. Good 
reasoning preserves correctness, other things equal. But enkratic reasoning does not preserve 
correctness. This is because what you ought to do depends on your epistemic position, but what 
it is correct to intend does not. In this paper, I motivate these claims and thus show that there is a 
puzzle. I then argue that the best solution is to deny that correctness is always independent of 
your epistemic position. As I explain, a notable upshot is that a central epistemic norm directs us 
to believe, not simply what is true, but what we are in a position to know.  
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Suppose you are wondering whether to stop by the deli. You’d like to get bagels but you’re also 
running late for an appointment. After brief consideration, you figure that it won’t matter much if 
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you’re a little later still and so come to believe that you ought to stop by the deli. On that basis, 
you form the intention to stop by the deli.  
 This last step is an example of what Broome (2013) calls enkratic reasoning: moving 
from a belief that you ought to do something to an intention to do that thing. It seems like good 
reasoning. Of course, you might make mistakes along the way. You might be wrong about the 
pros and cons, or how they stack up. You might be unjustified in these assessments. Still, 
considered just as a transition of thought, independently of the status of its inputs, enkratic 
reasoning seems hard to fault. 
 Indeed, enkratic reasoning seems to play a central role in deliberation. When you 
deliberate, you try to figure out what to do – to settle on a course of action, by forming an 
intention. If, during deliberation, you reach the conclusion that you ought to act in a certain way, 
you can close deliberation, by settling on acting in that way. But this just is to engage in enkratic 
reasoning: to form an intention on the basis of a belief about what you ought to do. Enkratic 
reasoning is thus a central way of bringing deliberation to a close. 
 These remarks concern beliefs about what you ought to do in the ‘all-out’, ‘overall’, or, 
as I shall say, ‘deliberative’ sense of ‘ought’. In the example above, you might believe that you 
ought, given only your concern for bagels, to stop by the deli and that you ought, given only your 
concern for your appointment, to head straight there. These beliefs do not allow you to form 
intentions. But it is extremely plausible that there is a further question you can ask: given this 
conflict, what ought I to do? It is answering this question that allows you to move to an 
intention.1 
 
1 Although terminology varies, the deliberative ought plays an important role in much normative philosophy. 
Prominent examples include Broome 2013, Davidson 1980, Gibbard 1992, Korsgaard 1996, Parfit 2011, and 
Williams 1965 (the source of the term ‘deliberative “ought”’). For useful recent discussions see Kiesewetter 2017, 
Lord 2015, McPherson 2018, Schroeder 2011a. Some doubt there is any such ‘ought’ (Tiffany 2007; Baker 2018). 
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 So enkratic reasoning seems good – indeed, it seems like it must be good. But there is a 
puzzle about how it could be. In short, the puzzle is that a highly plausible claim about good 
reasoning – that good reasoning must preserve correctness – seems to imply that enkratic 
reasoning is not good. In §1 I explain and motivate this claim about good reasoning. In §2 I 
explain how it seems to imply that enkratic reasoning is not good. In §3 I discuss three possible 
responses to the puzzle, and defend my preferred response. In §4 I defend this response against 
the objection that it fails to deal with some related puzzles. As I explain there, a notable upshot is 
that a central epistemic norm directs us to believe, not simply what is true, but what we are in a 
position to know. 
 
1. Good Reasoning 
 
The puzzle begins with the following claim: 
 
(GR) Good reasoning preserves correctness, other things equal. 
 
That is: good reasoning is such as to lead you from correct responses to a further correct 
response, other things equal. This requires some explanation.2  
 First, I take reasoning to be a kind of transition between responses. The responses I will 
be interested in are attitudes, and especially beliefs and intentions. So, for example, you might 
reason to the belief that the deli is open from your beliefs that the deli is open until 6pm and that 
 
Doubts might target either the psychological claim that there is an intelligible concept here or the metaphysical 
claim that there is a corresponding property. I only presuppose the former.  
2 For further clarification and defence of GR, see McHugh and Way 2018. Cf. Wedgwood 2007: 99ff; Worsnip 
2019. 
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it’s now 5.30pm. Or you might reason to an intention to go to the deli from your intention to get 
bagels and a belief that there are bagels at the deli. I will call the responses you reason from your 
premise-responses and the response you reason to your conclusion-response. Where these 
responses are beliefs, their contents are your premises and conclusion, respectively. 
 Second, in saying that a piece of reasoning is good, I am making a prospective 
assessment of a transition. It is prospective in that it is an assessment of a type of reasoning, 
rather than a retrospective assessment of any token of that type; that a token piece of reasoning 
exemplifies a good type of reasoning does not ensure that it is done well, or competently. And it 
concerns the transition in that it is independent of any assessment of the responses from which 
the reasoning begins: a piece of reasoning might be good even if it starts from mistaken or 
unjustified responses. 
 Third, correctness is a normative status. To say that an attitude is correct is to say that it 
gets things right; its object merits, is worthy of, or makes fitting, that attitude. This notion shows 
up in a wide range of normative theorising. For many epistemologists, a central epistemic norm 
is that it is correct to believe just what is true.3 Many value-theorists are interested in whether the 
valuable can be analysed in terms of correct valuing – for instance, whether being admirable is 
being correct to admire.4 Moral responsibility theorists are interested in when a person is worthy 
of praise or blame – that is, when it is correct to praise or blame them.5 Plausibly, the same 
notion of correctness is at play in all of these inquiries. For example, one central mark of this 
notion is that it is insensitive to incentives. That you would be rewarded for believing, admiring, 
or blaming does not bear on whether such an attitude would be correct.6 
 
3 See, e.g. Boghossian 2003, Shah and Velleman 2005, Wedgwood 2007: 100, Whiting 2013. 
4 See Jacobson 2011 for an overview. 
5 See Eshleman 2014 for an overview.  
6 For more on correctness, or what I elsewhere call ‘fittingness’, see Howard 2018 and McHugh and Way 2016. 
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 Intentions can also be correct or incorrect. Just as correct admiration and correct blame at 
least correspond to evaluative properties – the admirable and the blameworthy – correct intention 
corresponds to an evaluative property: the choiceworthy. To choose is to form an intention, and 
the choiceworthy is what merits choice. Of course, what makes for choiceworthiness is a 
contentious question. For example, consequentialists will think it has to do with promoting value, 
deontologists will disagree.7 Equally though, it is a contentious question what makes someone 
admirable, or blameworthy. We will not need to investigate these questions here.  
 With these clarifications made, we can see why GR is plausible. First, paradigm cases of 
good reasoning preserve correctness. The clearest example is deductive theoretical reasoning. 
Deductive theoretical reasoning is guaranteed to preserve truth, and truth is widely taken to be 
what makes belief correct. But it is also plausible that, other things equal, non-deductive 
theoretical reasoning preserves truth. For instance, it is a plausible defeasible rule of good 
reasoning to believe p if someone says p. And it is also plausible that other things equal, if 
someone says p, then p. 
 Paradigmatic forms of practical reasoning also preserve correctness. For example, it is 
good practical reasoning to move from intending an end to intending a means you believe 
necessary to achieve that end. And if an end is choiceworthy, and a means is necessary for that 
end, then that means is also choiceworthy. Plausible defeasible rules of practical reasoning also 
preserve correctness, other things equal. For instance, it is a plausible defeasible rule of good 
reasoning to move from believing that you promised to φ to intending to φ. And it is plausible 
that other things equal, if you promised to φ, then φ-ing is choiceworthy.8 
 
7 Such disputes between moral theorists are only one relevant point of contention, given that non-moral 
considerations are also plausibly relevant to choiceworthiness. 
8 There are obviously questions about how to understand this ‘other things equal’ clause. I flag this issue when 
relevant. See McHugh and Way 2018 for discussion. 
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 There is also a more theoretical rationale for GR. The standard for good reasoning should 
fit with the point or aim of reasoning. Reasoning is a way of forming new attitudes. But the point 
of reasoning is not just to form any old attitudes; it is to form attitudes with a certain normative 
status. The most plausible candidate for this status, I suggest, is correctness. In reasoning we are 
trying to get things right in our beliefs and intentions. We are not just trying to form beliefs and 
intentions which cohere with our other attitudes, or for which there are good reasons. Consider, 
for example, that in theoretical reasoning, we aim to form beliefs that are true. But beliefs can 
cohere with our other attitudes and be supported by good reasons without being true.9  
If in reasoning we aim to get things right in our beliefs and intentions, then we should 
expect good reasoning to be well-suited to success in this aim. Of course, reasoning cannot be 
expected to generate correct responses from nothing: starting points matter. But what reasoning 
can do is keep us on track. Thus we can expect good reasoning to preserve correctness, at least 
other things equal.  
 Finally, it should be stressed that GR is only a necessary condition on good reasoning. 
There are serious challenges to the idea that correctness-preservation is sufficient for good 
reasoning: for instance, it doesn’t seem like just any reasoning to belief in a necessary truth is 
good reasoning. In other work, I discuss how to develop GR into a full account of good 
reasoning, in light of such challenges (McHugh and Way 2018). But the puzzle I want to raise 
does not depend on whether this can be done. 
 
2. The Puzzle 
 
 
9 See McHugh and Way 2018 for further discussion. 
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GR implies that enkratic reasoning is good only if it preserves correctness. That is: 
 
 (GR-ER)  Other things equal, if it is correct to believe that you ought to φ, then it is  
   correct to intend to φ.  
 
(GR-ER) has the air of plausibility. But on reflection it turns out to be problematic.  
 Assume the plausible and widely held view that it is correct to believe just what is true. 
Given this, GR-ER implies: 
 
(*)  Other things equal, if you ought to φ, it is correct to intend to φ. 
 
It is very plausible that what you ought to do – in the deliberative sense – is constrained by your 
epistemic position. That is, factors that are not epistemically accessible to you do not bear on 
what you ought to do. Consider Judith Thomson’s (1990: 229) well-known example in which, 
due to an extraordinary and unforseeable coincidence, flipping the light switch when you get 
home will cause a small lightning flash in your neighbour’s home, and badly burn them. 
Thomson held that in this case you ought to refrain from flipping the switch. But many people 
have a different reaction: given that the harm to your neighbour is unforeseeable, it is okay to flip 
the switch. This reaction presupposes that what you ought to do is constrained by your epistemic 
position. 
 By contrast, the correctness of a response – in the sense introduced – does not seem 
constrained by your epistemic position. I assumed that it is correct to believe just what is true, 
but what is true does not generally depend on your epistemic position. And the point is not 
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specific to belief. Consider emotions. You get things right in your emotions when they are 
directed towards objects with certain evaluative properties. For instance, it is correct to admire 
the admirable and blame the blameworthy. But whether a person is admirable or an act 
blameworthy does not depend on your epistemic position: someone might be blameworthy for 
deeds outside your ken. It thus seems a general principle that the correctness of a response is not 
constrained by your epistemic position.10 
 This apparent difference between correctness and ‘ought’ gives rise to counter-examples 
to (*). Consider Thomson’s example again. If the fact that flipping the switch will harm your 
neighbour does not bear on what you ought to do, then presumably you ought to flip the switch. 
The epistemically accessible facts – principally, that flipping the switch will illuminate the room 
– support doing so. But if corrent intention is not epistemically constrained, then it is not correct 
to intend to flip the switch. Given all the facts, including that flipping the switch will harm your 
neighbor, that is not the right choice. 
 So (*), and thus GR-ER, appears false. But (GR-ER) followed from the assumptions that 
enkratic reasoning is good and that good reasoning preserves correctness. Since both these 
assumptions are plausible, we have a puzzle. 
 Before moving on, it should be emphasised that this result does not turn on conflating 
senses of ‘ought’ and ‘correct’. No doubt these terms can express different notions. In particular, 
each can express epistemically constrained and epistemically unconstrained notions. We can 
make sense of claims about what you ought to do given all the facts, and what you ought to do 
given only the epistemically accessible facts. And we can make sense of claims about what it is 
 
10 For more or less explicit endorsement of this principle see e.g. D’Arms and Jacobson 2000: 69; Deonna and 
Teroni 2012: 6-7; Gibbard 2005: 339-41; Rosen 2015: 70; Svavarsdóttir 2014: 106; Wedgwood 2007: 156; Worsnip 
2019: 146. 
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correct to intend given all the facts and what it is correct to intend given only the epistemically 
accessible facts. However, it is a substantive question whether what you deliberatively ought to 
do depends on all the facts or only the epistemically accessible facts. And it is a substantive 
question whether what it is correct to intend, in the sense in which good reasoning preserves 
correctness, depends on all the facts or only the epistemically accessible facts. The puzzle arises 
because the answers to these questions seem to diverge. In the relevant senses, what you ought to 
do is epistemically constrained, while what it is correct to intend is not.   
  
3. Responses to the Puzzle  
 
The puzzle depends on four claims:  
 
(1) Good reasoning preserves correctness, other things equal (GR). 
(2) Enkratic reasoning is good. 
(3) What you ought to do is constrained by your epistemic position. 
(4) What it is correct to intend is not constrained by your epistemic position. 
 
Responses to the puzzle must either reject one of these claims or show that they are compatible. 
In the rest of this paper, I consider some of these options. Since I have already explained why I 
find it plausible that enkratic reasoning is good and that good reasoning preserves correctness, I 
will not further consider (1) or (2). While the puzzle might show that one of these claims should 
be rejected, my interest is in whether they can be retained.11 So I will instead consider versions 
 
11 The only writer I know of to reject (2) is Southwood (2016). See Broome 2016 for a response. While (1) is more 
contentious, alternative views of good reasoning face their own issues about enkratic reasoning. For instance, the 
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of the three other options: rejecting (3), rejecting (4), and maintaining that (1)-(4) are compatible. 
To anticipate, I shall argue that the best solution is to reject (4) and thus hold that what it is 
correct to intend is epistemically constrained. 
 
3.1. Can We Accept Each of (1)-(4)? 
 
(1)-(4) are not strictly incompatible. What (1) – (GR) – requires is that good reasoning preserve 
correctness other things equal. Thus it does not imply that there cannot be cases in which it is 
correct to believe that you ought to φ but not correct to intend to φ. It only implies that any such 
cases must be ones in which other things are not equal. So an initially attractive response to our 
puzzle says that in the cases which generate it, other things aren’t equal. If this response can be 
defended, we can resolve the puzzle without rejecting any of (1)-(4). 
 A final assessment of this response requires detailed consideration of how GR’s ‘other 
things equal’ clause is to be understood. However, we need not get into this to see reason for 
scepticism. 
We can distinguish between defeasible and indefeasible good reasoning. Roughly, a good 
piece of reasoning is defeasible when there are responses that can coherently be added to its 
premise-responses so that the reasoning is no longer good. Many good pieces of reasoning are 
defeasible in this way. For instance, the reasoning you could express by saying ‘the deli’s 
standard hours are 8am-6pm; it’s now 5.30pm, so the deli will be open’ is good. But if you add 
the premise that the deli’s Facebook page says that it’s closing early today, it is no longer good. 
 
view that good reasoning must preserve justification forms the basis of an argument that justified beliefs about what 
you ought to do must be true (Way and Whiting 2016). Since this is a surprising conclusion, this view also does not 
straightforwardly vindicate enkratic reasoning.  
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Other pieces of reasoning seem indefeasible. If you reason instead from the premise that the deli 
is open from 8am-6pm today, then it’s hard to see what could coherently be added to spoil the 
reasoning. Of course, we can think of considerations that could lead you to give up one of the 
premises – such as the Facebook announcement. But that is for one of the premises to be 
undermined, rather than for the reasoning to be defeated.  
 The point of the ‘other things equal’ clause in GR is to allow for defeasibility. So when a 
piece of reasoning is indefeasibly good, we might expect a stricter version of GR to apply: 
indefeasibly good reasoning should preserve correctness in all cases. 
 Enkratic reasoning seems indefeasible. It is hard to think of attitudes that can coherently 
be added to its premise-responses which would spoil it. For example, if you believe that you 
ought to stop by the deli, learning of new reasons against going to the deli will not stop it being 
good reasoning to move to an intention to go to the deli. New reasons might lead you to drop the 
belief that you ought to stop by the deli. But again, that is for the premise of the reasoning to be 
undermined, not for the reasoning to be defeated (cf. Way and Whiting 2016: 1877-8).  
 If this is right, we can restate the claims on which the puzzle rests: 
 
 (1′) Indefeasibly good reasoning preserves correctness in all cases. 
 (2′) Enkratic reasoning is indefeasibly good. 
(3) What you ought to do is constrained by your epistemic position. 
(4) What it is correct to intend is not constrained by your epistemic position. 
 
These claims are incompatible. (1) and (2) imply  
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(GR-ER′)  In all cases, if it is correct to believe that you ought to φ, then it is   
   correct to intend to φ. 
 
But if (3) and (4) are true, then this is false. In Thomson’s case, it is correct to believe that you 
ought to flip the switch, but not correct to intend to flip the switch. 
 At this point, some resist (2′). Indeed, some philosophers hold that there are no cases of 
indefeasibly good reasoning. This view is motivated by cases of higher-order evidence: evidence 
which bears on whether you are in a position to respond appropriately to normatively relevant 
considerations.12 For instance, if you believe that your reasoning capacities have been impaired, 
it might not seem good reasoning to perform even a paradigmatic form of good deductive 
reasoning, such as modus ponens reasoning. In the same circumstances, enkratic reasoning might 
not seem good. 
 Such cases are far from clear-cut; they raise a host of contentious issues. However, even 
if they do show that there are no cases of indefeasibly good reasoning, it remains plausible that 
there are types of reasoning which are immune from certain kinds of defeat. Many good pieces 
of reasoning can be defeated by countervailing considerations or by considerations that 
undermine the support that the premise appeared to provide for the conclusion-response.13 Some 
good pieces of reasoning – such as deductive theoretical reasoning – cannot be defeated in this 
way. Furthermore, it remains plausible that reasoning which is immune from defeat in this way 
preserves correctness in all cases. Even if higher-order evidence can spoil a deductively good 
 
12 For general discussion see, e.g. Bradley 2019; Christensen 2010; Lasonen-Aarnio 2014. 
13 In our example, the announcement that the deli is closing early today is a countervailing consideration for the 
premise that the deli’s standard hours are 8am-6pm. An example of an undermining consideration is that the deli is 
not running its standard hours today. For discussion see, e.g. Pollock 1987, Dancy 2004: ch.3, Schroeder 2011b, 
Horty 2013: chs. 2 and 5. 
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piece of reasoning, this is not because it shows that the premise-responses can be correct while 
the conclusion-response is not. If such reasoning is defeasible, this must be because of some 
further condition on good reasoning.14  
 Enkratic reasoning seems to fall into this category. Even it can be defeated by higher-
order evidence, it does not seem defeasible by countervailing or undermining considerations. If 
this is right, the puzzle remains – we just need to read ‘indefeasibly’ in (1′) and (2′) as meaning 
‘indefeasible by countervailing or undermining considerations’.  
 I conclude that that the puzzle cannot easily be resolved by appeal to GR’s ‘other things 
equal’ clause. If we are to maintain GR and that enkratic reasoning is good, we must reject either 
(3) or (4). I now consider these options. 
 
3.2. Rejecting (3): Objectivism about Ought 
 
There is an important debate between objectivists and perspectivists about what you ought to do. 
Perspectivists hold that only epistemically accessible facts bear on what you ought to do. 
Objectivists deny this; all facts are in principle relevant. Objectivists hold that in Thomson’s 
case, the fact that flipping the switch will harm your neighbour is relevant to whether you ought 
to flip the switch, and thus that you ought to refrain from flipping the switch.15  
 
14 These claims are clearly true if the standard of correctness for belief is truth. Things are more complicated if, as I 
consider below, the standard of correctness is being in a position to know – it will depend on how this notion is 
cashed out. 
15 For objectivist views, see Graham 2010, Schroeder 2018a, Thomson 1990: 172-3, 229-42, Wedgwood 2013. For 
perspectivist views, see Broome 2013: ch.3, Lord 2015, McHugh and Way 2017, Kiesewetter 2017: ch.8. 
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 Objectivists will thus deny (3). In this way, our puzzle might seem to rest on a 
contentious view about what you ought to do. Indeed, the puzzle might be thought grounds for 
preferring objectivism to perspectivism. 
 I do not mean to rule out objectivism. However, if we are interested in vindicating 
enkratic reasoning, objectivism is not the way to go. As other well-known cases show, if 
objectivism is true, then enkratic reasoning is not generally good. Consider Frank Jackson’s 
(1991) Doctor case. You are a doctor treating a patient with a minor but non-trivial illness. You 
could administer drug A, drug B, or drug C. You know that one of drugs A and B will 
completely cure the patient and the other will kill them. However, you do not know, and cannot 
find out, which of drugs A and B is the cure and which is the killer. You do know that drug C 
will partially cure the patient. You are therefore in a position to know that you objectively – 
given all the facts – ought not give drug C. However, it is clear that it is not good reasoning to 
move from the belief that you objectively ought not give drug C to the intention not to give drug 
C. It would be grossly irresponsible to rule out giving drug C. If objectivism is true though, what 
you ought to do is what you objectively ought to do. Thus the objectivist must also deny that it is 
good reasoning to move from the belief that you ought not give drug C to the intention not to 
give drug C. So objectivism does not offer a way out of the puzzle that vindicates enkratic 
reasoning.16 
 This may seem too quick. It might be replied that in enkratic reasoning you move from a 
belief that you ought to act to an intention to act. But in the Doctor case, you believe that you 
 
16 Given objectivism, the transition from believing that you objectively ought not give drug C to an intention not to 
give drug C does preserve correctness. This doesn’t mean that objectivists are committed to thinking that this 
transition is good reasoning: GR is only a necessary condition on good reasoning.  
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ought not act in a certain way. So the case doesn’t show that objectivists cannot vindicate 
enkratic reasoning. 
 This reply shows that we need to be more precise about how we are understanding 
enkratic reasoning. In enkratic reasoning, you move from believing that you ought to φ to 
intending to φ. But what can we substitute for ‘φ’ here? I think it is plausible that enkratic 
reasoning is good whenever φ-ing is something that you believe to be under your control, in the 
sense that you will (not) φ if and because you intend (not) to (cf. Broome 2013: 290). Omissions 
can be under your control in this sense, and so beliefs about what you ought not to do can feature 
in enkratic reasoning. But this seems the right result. To judge that you ought not φ, when φ-ing 
is under your control, is to judge that φ-ing is not to be done – it is to take φing to be ruled out. 
This seems to commit you to not φ-ing, and thus it seems good reasoning to move to an intention 
not to φ. If so then, since, in the Doctor case, you are aware that giving drug C is under your 
control, objectivism fails to vindicate a plausible form of enkratic reasoning. 
 It might be suggested that the Doctor case is itself a counter-example to this 
precisification of enkratic reasoning (cf. Graham 2010; Wedgwood 2007: 30-31; 2013). After all, 
the objectivist will take the Doctor case to be one in which you can know that you ought not give 
drug C, and that not giving drug C is under your control, and yet it is not good reasoning to move 
to an intention not to give drug C. But this description of the case is theory driven: the intuitive 
verdict on the Doctor case is that you ought to give drug C (cf. Kiesewetter 2017: 210). Nor is it 
natural to think that the following expresses good reasoning: ‘I don’t know which of drugs A and 
B is the full cure; it is clear that I ought not give drug C. Nonetheless, I’ll give drug C’. The case 
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gives us no independent grounds for rejecting the proposed precisification of enkratic 
reasoning.17, 18 
 
3.3. Rejecting (4): Moderate Objectivism about Correctness 
 
The upshot of the previous two sections is that if we are to maintain that good reasoning 
preserves correctness, and that enkratic reasoning is good, we must reject (4), the claim that what 
it is correct to intend is not constrained by your epistemic position. This is my preferred response 
to the puzzle, and I begin to defend it here. While I won’t provide a direct argument against (4), I 
will show how two natural arguments for (4) can be resisted. In the absence of further arguments 
for (4), I thus propose to take the plausibility of (1)-(3) as grounds for rejecting (4). 
 
3.1.1. The Argument from Plausible Cases 
 
The first argument says that (4) follows from the way I have characterised the notion of 
correctness. 
 
17 Wedgwood (2007: 30-31; 2013: 489-90; cf. Srinivasan 2015) takes Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument (2000: 
93-106) to show that we are not always in a position to know what we ought to do. He suggests that it follows that 
there will be Doctor-style counter-examples to the claim that enkratic reasoning is good. There will be cases in 
which you have three options, φ, ψ, and χ, such that (i) you ought to φ, (ii) you know only that either you ought to φ 
or you ought to ψ, (iii) you know that whichever of φ-ing and ψ-ing is impermissible is very seriously wrong, and 
(iv) you know that χing is less seriously wrong. However, the anti-luminosity argument does not show that such 
cases are possible. If successful, it only shows that you can fail to be in a position to know what you ought to do in a 
borderline case – roughly, a case which would be near the border in a series which moves gradually from the clearly 
permissible to the clearly required. 
18 Another way of rejecting (3) bears mention. Contextualists about ‘ought’ deny that what you ought to do is 
constrained by your epistemic position. Rather, truths about what you ought to do, in a context of utterance, are 
constrained by an epistemic position determined by that context – this need not be the subject’s (cf. Dowell 2013, 
Björnnson and Finlay 2010). Relativists (e.g. MacFarlane (2014: ch.11) and expressivists (cf. Schroeder (2018a) 
might make similar claims. However, this view does not resolve the puzzle. If correct intention depends on all the 
facts, the puzzle arises so long as truths about what a subject ought to do can, as contextualists accept, depend on a 
less than omniscient epistemic position. 
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An attitude is correct if it gets things right – if its object merits, is worthy of, or makes 
fitting, that attitude. Plausible cases include that it is correct to believe truths, admire the 
admirable, and blame the blameworthy. But whether a proposition is true, or a person 
admirable or blameworthy, does not generally depend on your epistemic position. There 
are many other examples too: an outcome might be desirable, and thus correct to desire, 
due to factors we are ignorant of. We should therefore accept objectivism about 
correctness: the correctness of a response is not constrained by your epistemic position. 
And objectivism implies (4). 
 
In response, we should distinguish strong objectivism and moderate objectivism. Strong 
objectivism holds that the correctness of a response is, in all cases, independent of your 
epistemic position. Moderate objectivism holds that the correctness of a response need not 
depend on your epistemic position. Only strong objectivism implies (4): moderate objectivism 
can allow that there are responses whose correctness depends on your epistemic position. And it 
is moderate objectivism that is most directly motivated by the examples which the argument 
from plausible cases begins from. These examples suggest that the correctness of some responses 
is determined independently of your epistemic position. They do not show that the correctness of 
all responses is so determined.19  
 
19 The literature tends to define objectivism, either about ‘ought’ or correctness, as I have defined strong objectivism 
(cf. Kiesewetter 2017: 196, Lord 2015: 26, Worsnip 2019: 146). However, moderate objectivism is the negation of a 
natural definition of perspectivism, as the view that correctness, or ‘ought’, must be determined by epistemically 
accessible considerations. Furthermore, many discussions focus on objectivism about how you ought to act. Here the 
difference between moderate and strong objectivism is idle. 
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 Indeed, it fairly natural to think that the correctness of some responses is epistemically 
constrained. Consider interrogative attitudes: for example, wondering, or being curious, about a 
certain question.20 Plausibly, there are questions which merit curiosity, and questions which do 
not. Whether we have free will, whether Trump will be reelected, and whether the deli is open 
might all merit curiosity; whether there is an odd number of dust particles on my bookshelf does 
not. But whether a question merits curiosity seems epistemically constrained. If you know 
whether the deli is open but I do not, then even if it is fitting for me to be curious about whether 
the deli is open, it is not fitting for you to be. Or consider credences. Correct credence 
corresponds to something very much like a value property – credibility. But whether a 
proposition is credible – and thus whether it is correct to have a certain credence in it – surely 
depends on your epistemic position.  
 Nor is there anything incoherent in the idea that the same property of correctness could 
apply in a way that depends on your epistemic position in some cases but not others. Think about 
it this way. Each response is subject to a standard of correctness – a principle that specifies the 
conditions under which that response is correct. The standard of correctness for belief might be 
truth, the standard of correctness for credence might be what is probable given your epistemic 
position. As these examples illustrate, standards of correctness can vary in whether they specify 
conditions that depend on your epistemic position. But they are all standards for the same 
property of correctness. 
 So the way I have characterised correctness does not force us to accept (4). That there are 
plausible cases in which the correctness of a response is epistemically unconstrained does not 
show that the correctness of a response is always epistemically unconstrained.  
 
20 Cf. Friedman 2013. 
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 In response, it might be suggested that correct intention is itself a plausible example of a 
response whose correctness is epistemically unconstrained. But this is unconvincing. It is correct 
to intend the choiceworthy. And while it is clear that the admirable and blameworthy are 
epistemically unconstrained, it is far from clear that the choiceworthy is. Consider the Doctor 
case. Since there is a good chance that drug A is the killer, it seems too risky to give drug A. I’m 
inclined to think that this is relevant to whether giving drug A is choiceworthy, and thus that 
choiceworthiness is epistemically constrained.21  This strikes me as a difference between 
choiceworthiness and some other evaluative properties: that Jones might be a killer does not 
make him blameworthy, whereas that drug A might be a killer does make giving drug A 
unchoiceworthy. But I don’t want to put weight on this thought. The important point is negative: 
epistemic position is not clearly irrelevant to choiceworthiness in the way that it is to 
admirability and blameworthiness. So we shouldn’t take correct intention as a further plausible 
case of a response whose correctness is epistemically unconstrained.  
 
3.1.2. The Argument from Reasoning 
 




21 I assume that epistemic considerations – considerations of what might happen, or what there is a chance of 
happening – are relevant to choiceworthiness only if choiceworthiness is epistemically constrained. This is because 
it is hard to see how to weigh epistemic considerations against facts outside your epistemic position. For instance, it 
is hard to see how to weigh the fact that drug A might be the killer against the fact that it is not the killer. Cf. 
Kiesewetter 2017: 203. 
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In reasoning, we aim to get things right – to form correct attitudes. In particular, in 
practical reasoning, or deliberation, we aim to form correct intentions. But in 
deliberation, we aim to settle on doing what is best – that is, the thing to do given all the 
facts. And if the aim of the deliberation is to settle on doing what is best, and the aim of 
deliberation is to form a correct intention, then what it is correct to intend must be what is 
best. And since what is best is epistemically unconstrained, what it is correct to intend 
must be epistemically unconstrained.  
  
The crucial premise of this argument is that in deliberation we aim to settle on doing what is 
best, given all the facts. I do not think we need to accept this premise. I know of two reasons we 
might accept it, and I do not think either is compelling. 
 The first appeals to some observations about deliberation. It makes sense for deliberating 
agents to seek out further information, when possible. And it makes sense for better-informed 
advisors to rely on their own information, rather than just the subject’s information. These 
observations are neatly explained if in deliberation we aim at what is best (Lord 2015: 44ff). 
 However, we can also explain these observations by assuming that deliberators are 
concerned to do what they ought to do. Of course, given perspectivism, what you ought to do 
depends on your epistemic position. But we need not think that your epistemic position is 
constituted only by facts you are currently aware of. We can hold instead that your epistemic 
position is constituted by facts which are available to you by the time of action (Dowell 2013, 
Kiesewetter 2017: ch.7, Björnnson and Finlay 2010). While this notion of availability needs 
spelling out, such a view clearly promises to explain why it makes sense for you to seek out 
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further facts, and for better informed advisors to take them into account. So these observations 
do not strongly support the view that deliberation aims at what is best.22 
 The second reason turns on an analogy between practical and theoretical reasoning. In 
theoretical reasoning, it seems, we aim at truth. For example, you might aim to come to a true 
belief about whether the deli is open. And if the aim of theoretical reasoning is epistemically 
unconstrained, we might think that the aim of practical reasoning will be too. 
 This line of thought is not watertight: the aims of practical and theoretical reasoning 
might differ in whether they are epistemically constrained. As will emerge though, I think it is 
important that practical and theoretical reasoning are alike in this regard. So I want to show that 
the argument fails even granting this point. To do so, we need to reconsider a claim which has 
thus far been taken for granted: that it is correct to believe just what is true. This claim is 
plausible and widely held. But it is not trivial or incontestable. Again, to say that a belief is 
correct is to say that it is merited by, or fitting to, its object. It is a substantive question which 
objects of belief – which propositions – merit belief. 
 Although the view that what merits belief is truth is a natural one, it is not the only 
contender. Another natural view, which can also be found in the literature, is that what merits 
belief is being in a position to know.23 This view makes the correctness of belief depend on your 
epistemic position. But as we have seen, that is compatible with moderate objectivism about 
correctness.  
 
22 Some might take ‘ought’ judgments made in light of information that is not available by the time of action to 
support the view that deliberation aims at what is best (cf. Lord 2015, MacFarlane 2014: ch.11). However, as 
Dowell (2013) argues, it is far from clear that such judgments concern the deliberative ought. 
23 Smithies 2010: 283-5. Although he does not speak of ‘correctness’, Williamson’s (forthcoming) claim that the 
‘primary norm’ of belief is to believe only what you know is naturally understood as supporting a similar view. 
Compare his remark that ‘knowledge sets the standard of appropriateness for belief… mere belief is a kind of 
botched knowing’ (2000: 47).  
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 With this view on the table, we can see where the argument from analogy goes wrong. 
For it is not at all clear that in theoretical reasoning we aim only at the truth. It is at least equally 
plausible that in theoretical reasoning, we aim to figure out the truth. To figure out the truth is 
not just to come to a true belief; it is to come to know. And whether you know a truth clearly 
depends on your epistemic position. The thought that in theoretical reasoning we aim at truth is 
thus compatible with the view that the aim of theoretical reasoning – and thus what it is correct 
to believe – is epistemically constrained. So it does not underwrite an argument by analogy that 
the aim of practical reasoning is epistemically unconstrained.  
 I conclude that neither of the reasons for accepting that in deliberation we aim at what is 
best are persuasive, and thus that the argument from reasoning fails. We can accept that 
reasoning aims at correctness while denying (4). 
 Before moving on, let me address a worry. As stated, our puzzle assumes that it is correct 
to believe just what is true. But I have now suggested that we should be open to rejecting this 
assumption. It might seem that if we do, the puzzle dissolves.  
 However, this is a mistake. Here is the puzzle again. We assume that (1), good reasoning 
preserves correctness, and (2), enkratic reasoning is good. These claims imply: 
 
 (GR-ER)  Other things equal, if it is correct to believe that you ought to φ, then it is  
   correct to intend to φ. 
 
If it is correct to believe just what you are in a position to know, GR-ER implies: 
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 (**) Other things equal, if you are in a position to know that you ought to φ, it is  
  correct to intend to φ. 
 
But if (3), what you ought to do is constrained by your epistemic position, and (4), what it is 
correct to intend is not, (**) is false. In Thomson’s example, you are presumably in a position to 
know that you ought to flip the switch – the epistemically accessible facts, such as that flipping 
the switch will illuminate the room, manifestly support doing so. But if what is correct to intend 
is not epistemically constrained, it is not correct to intend to flip the switch. Thus the puzzle 
arises whether it is correct to believe just what’s true or just what you are in a position to know.24 
  
4. Related Puzzles  
 
I have proposed that we solve the puzzle by rejecting (4) – the claim that correct intention is 
epistemically unconstrained. I’ve shown that two natural arguments for (4) fail; absent further 
arguments, we can thus take the plausibility of (1)-(3) as grounds for rejecting (4). In this 
section, I consider an objection. It might be thought that my preferred solution leads to problems 
when applied to closely related puzzles. I consider three versions of this concern. 
 
4.1. Quasi-Enkratic Reasoning 
 
In quasi-enkratic reasoning, you move from believing that you ought to have an attitude to that 
attitude. Examples include reasoning from believing that you ought to believe p to believing p, 
 
24 The puzzle does require that correct belief is factive. This view is widely held; I defend it in §4.3. 
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reasoning from believing that you ought to desire X to desiring X, and reasoning from believing 
that you ought to admire S to admiring S.  
 Quasi-enkratic reasoning might seem good. But the puzzle arises for it too. If what you 
ought to believe, desire, and admire is epistemically constrained, but what it is correct to believe, 
desire, and admire is not, then such reasoning does not preserve correctness. If we were to 
respond to this puzzle in the way we responded to the original puzzle, we would be led to say 
that the correctness of all responses is epistemically constrained. But that is to give up on even 
moderate objectivism about correctness. 
 However, we don’t need to respond to this puzzle in the same way. Rather, we should 
deny that quasi-enkratic reasoning is good. It is therefore not a problem if GR fails to vindicate 
it. 
 To begin with, it should be stressed that quasi-enkratic reasoning is not enkratic 
reasoning. In enkratic reasoning, you move from a belief that you ought to do something – that 
you take to be under your control – to an intention to do that thing. Quasi-enkratic reasoning, by 
contrast, moves from a belief that you ought to have an attitude to that attitude. Since this is a 
different transition, there is no immediate reason to think that because enkratic reasoning is good, 
quasi-enkratic reasoning is good. 
 Once we are clear about this difference, it is not obvious why we should think that quasi-
enkratic reasoning is good. Consider two examples: reasoning from believing you ought to 
believe p to believing p and from believing you ought to intend to φ to intending to φ. One useful 
heuristic for testing a piece of reasoning is to consider how it would be expressed in thought or 
talk. These pieces of reasoning could be expressed: ‘I ought to believe p, so, p’ and ‘I ought to 
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intend to φ, so, I’ll φ’. These passages of thought do not look cogent: their premises and 
conclusions concern very different topics. 
 This disconnect is made vivid by cases where you believe that you ought to have an 
attitude because it would be beneficial to have it. Suppose you reason: ‘believing that God exists 
will make me happy; if believing that God exists will me happy, I ought to believe in God; so, I 
ought to believe in God; so, God exists’. Something seems to have gone wrong in one’s 
reasoning here. But the first step is just modus ponens. The fault must thus lie with the second, 
‘quasi-enkratic’, step.25 
 I therefore doubt that quasi-enkratic reasoning is good, and so doubt that the proposed 
response to the puzzle overgeneralizes as suggested. 
 
4.2. Sufficient Evidence Reasoning 
 
Consider ‘sufficient evidence reasoning’: reasoning from the belief that there is sufficient 
evidence for p to believing p. This looks like a form of good reasoning. Indeed, it looks 
indefeasibly good – at least, it seems immune to defeat by countervailing or undermining 
considerations. But it doesn’t seem to preserve correctness. Sufficient evidence can still be 
misleading. Thus whether the standard of correctness for belief is truth or being in a position to 
know, there can be sufficient evidence for p though it is not correct to believe p.26 
 
25 This argument does not assume that the benefits of an attitude can make it the case that you ought to have that 
attitude. It only assumes that someone might believe this. 
26 Insofar as evidence provides the “right-kind” of reason for belief, sufficient evidence reasoning exemplifies a 
more general type of reasoning – roughly, reasoning from the belief that you ought, for right-kind reasons, to have 
an attitude, to that attitude. It might be thought that this more general type of reasoning also raises the puzzle. I am 
sceptical, but the suggestion raises too many issues to discuss here. On right-kind reasons, see Gertken and 
Kiesewetter 2017. 
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 This case seems very similar to our original puzzle. It looks like a form of indefeasibly 
good reasoning which does not preserve correctness in all cases. But the solution to the original 
puzzle doesn’t help. This puzzle arises even if the standard of correctness for belief is being in a 
position to know, and thus epistemically constrained.27 
 One might respond to this puzzle by denying that sufficient evidence can be misleading. 
This denial is not without precedent and can be motivated in various ways.28 Nonetheless, a 
commitment to the infallibility of sufficient evidence is a cost. Fortunately, we need not adopt 
this commitment. Even if we grant that this puzzle about sufficient evidence reasoning shows 
that indefeasibly good reasoning need not always preserve correctness, this is not enough to 
solve the puzzle about enkratic reasoning. It thus does not undermine the case for denying (4). 
Cases in which sufficient evidence reasoning fails to preserve correctness are opaque to 
the subject. That is, you cannot coherently think that the move from believing that there is 
sufficient evidence for p to believing p will fail to preserve correctness. That is because you 
cannot coherently think both that there’s sufficient evidence for p and that it is incorrect to 
believe p. This is clearly true if the standard of correctness for belief is truth – it’s incoherent to 
think that there’s sufficient evidence for p although p is not true. But it is also plausibly true if 
the standard of correctness for belief is being in a position to know. It seems incoherent to think 
that there is sufficient evidence for p although you are not in a position to know p. Whatever 
leads you to doubt that you are in a position to know should, it seems, lead you to doubt that the 
evidence for p is sufficient. 
 
27 Indeed, this puzzle also arises if it is correct to believe just what there is sufficient evidence for. That’s because, as 
cases of higher-order evidence illustrate, it appears that there can be sufficient but misleading evidence about what 
there is sufficient evidence for. 
28 For claims in this vicinity see e.g. Littlejohn 2012, Schroeder 2015, Whiting 2013, Williamson forthcoming. 
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This observation explains how sufficient evidence reasoning can be indefeasible despite 
failing to preserve correctness in all cases. A good piece of reasoning is defeasible if there are 
responses which can coherently be added to its premise-responses which stop it being good 
reasoning. But the fact that sufficient evidence reasoning may fail to preserve correctness does 
not imply that this condition is met. As we have just seen, the kind of considerations that might 
lead you to think that it is incorrect to believe p cannot be coherently combined with the belief 
that there is sufficient evidence for p. So they can’t provide defeaters for sufficient evidence 
reasoning. 
Thus, even if we deny that indefeasibly good reasoning preserves correctness in all cases, 
we should accept: 
 
(1′′)  Indefeasibly good reasoning can only fail to preserve correctness in ways that are 
 opaque to the subject. 
 
Together with (2′), the claim that enkratic reasoning is indefeasibly good, (1′′) implies that any 
cases in which it is correct to believe that you ought to φ but incorrect to intend to φ must be 
opaque to the subject. But if correct intention is not epistemically constrained, this is false. In the 
Doctor case, you can coherently believe that you ought to give drug C although it is not correct, 
given all of the facts, to intend to give drug C.  
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The upshot is that even if the puzzle about sufficient evidence reasoning shows that good 
reasoning need not preserve correctness in all cases, we still need to deny (4), that correct 
intention is not constrained by your epistemic position.29 
 
4.3. Instrumental Reasoning 
 
Suppose that you intend to get bagels and believe that you can get bagels at the deli. You might 
then reason to an intention to stop by the deli. This looks like a form of good (though defeasible) 
practical reasoning. However, if correct intention is epistemically constrained but correct belief 
is just true belief, it does not preserve correctness. If φ-ing is choiceworthy and you can φ by ψ-
ing, it doesn’t follow that ψ-ing is choiceworthy. If the fact that you can φ by ψ-ing is 
epistemically inaccessible to you, there might be little to be said for ψ-ing. 
 So if instrumental reasoning is good, and correct intention is epistemically constrained, 
correct belief must also be epistemically constrained. This is why I was happy to grant that 
correct intention and belief were alike in this respect in §3.1.2.  
 I don’t think this is problematic. As discussed, it is a substantive question what the 
standard of correctness for belief is. The view that it is correct to believe just what is true is a 
natural view, but so is the view that it is correct to believe just what you are in a position to 
know. The choice between these views must be made on theoretical grounds. The argument that 
correct intention is epistemically constrained, together with these observations about 
 
29 Of course, if we are to retain GR, and allow for misleading sufficient evidence, cases in which sufficient evidence 
reasoning fails to preserve correctness must be cases in which other things are not equal. A full defence of GR thus 
requires an interpretation of its ‘other things equal’ clause that gets this result. But these issues are to one side, here.  
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instrumental reasoning, contribute to the case for the latter view. I take this to be an important 
upshot of the preceding discussion. 
 Of course, one might hold that the standard of correctness for belief is epistemically 
constrained but deny that it has to do with knowledge. But previous points also tell against this 
position. In theoretical reasoning we aim at truth – or to figure out the truth. The normative status 
we seek in theoretical reasoning must thus be factive. And the most natural standard for belief 
that is both factive and depends on your epistemic position is being in a position to know.30  
 One might worry, again, that this treatment of instrumental reasoning will generalise to 
rule out moderate objectivism. But this does not seem to be the case. Consider another form of 
instrumental reasoning: reasoning from a desire to get bagels, and a belief that you can get bagels 
at the deli, to a desire to stop by the deli. If desires can figure in reasoning, this seems like good 
reasoning. And it is plausible that what is correct to desire – desirable – is not epistemically 
constrained. However, this reasoning preserves correctness even if the standard of correctness for 
belief is being in a position to know. If it is desirable to get bagels and you are in a position to 
know that you can bagels at the deli, then it is desirable to stop by the deli, at least insofar as it 
will allow you to get bagels. Of course, stopping at the store might not be desirable overall. So it 
might not be correct to desire overall to stop by the deli. But the move from a desire to get bagels 
to an overall desire to stop by the deli is clearly defeasible at best; we should not expect it to 
preserve correctness in all cases.31  
  
 
30 Of course, there are other candidate standards that meet these conditions. What makes belief correct might be that 
it is likely given your epistemic position and also true. Or what makes belief correct might simply be that it is 
knowledge. However, the first of these looks ad hoc. The second does not allow us to distinguish prospective and 
retrospective assessments of correctness. It is thus vulnerable to the objections of Schroeder 2018b.  
31 Similar points apply to putative examples of good reasoning from belief to other responses whose correctness 




In this paper, I have presented a puzzle about enkratic reasoning. Each of the following claims is 
plausible, but they seem incompatible: 
 
(1) Good reasoning preserves correctness, other things equal (GR). 
(2) Enkratic reasoning is good. 
(3) What you ought to do is constrained by your epistemic position. 
(4) What it is correct to intend is not constrained by your epistemic position. 
 
I have argued that – at least if we are to retain (1) and (2) – the most promising solution is to 
reject (4). While (1)-(4) are not strictly incompatible, given (1)’s ‘other things equal’ clause, we 
cannot easily resolve the puzzle by appeal to this clause. And if we reject (3), we have to reject 
(2) anyway. By contrast, there is no clear case for accepting (4). Nor does this solution run into 
problems when applied to related puzzles. The plausibility of (1)-(3) should thus be taken as an 
argument for rejecting (4). And in turn we can take the denial of (4) as the basis for an argument 
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